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Essential Components of a Tuberculosis Prevention
and Control Program
Recommendations of the Advisory Council
for the Elimination of Tuberculosis
Summary
Tuberculosis (TB) rates declined steadily for decades in the United States, but
several complex social and medical factors caused TB morbidity to increase 14%
from 1985 through 1993. The recent increases in TB morbidity have placed addi-
tional demands on state and local TB control programs, which already had been
substantially weakened by inadequate staffing and funding support. TB pro-
grams throughout the nation must be revitalized if they are to provide core TB
control activities that enable effective responses to this public health challenge.
This report describes a model for TB control programs and the essential compo-
nents of a successful TB control program, including three priority strategies for
TB prevention and control: a) identifying and treating persons who have active
TB, b) finding and screening persons who have had contact with TB patients to
determine whether they are infected with  Mycobacterium tuberculosis or have
active TB and providing appropriate treatment, and c) screening populations at
high risk for TB infection and the development of TB disease to detect infected
persons and providing therapy to prevent progression to active TB.
State and local health departments have primary responsibility for prevent-
ing and controlling TB. To meet this challenge successfully, TB control programs
should be able to administer activities that include the following core compo-
nents:
• conducting overall planning and development of policy,
• identifying persons who have clinically active TB,
• managing persons who have or who are suspected of having disease,
• identifying and managing persons infected with  M. tuberculosis,
• providing laboratory and diagnostic services,
• collecting and analyzing data, and
• providing training and education.
The Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis has prepared this
report to provide a national standard by which policymakers, TB control pro-
gram managers, and others evaluating TB programs can assess individual TB
control programs. The report may also help local programs to obtain and main-
tain adequate resources for TB control activities.
In addition to defining the essential components of a TB control program,
this report emphasizes the importance of a) prioritizing TB control activities;
b) coordinating care with other health-care providers, facilities, and community
organizations; c) using alternative approaches to TB control (e.g., the expanded
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use of directly observed therapy); d) targeting screening and prevention pro-
grams to high-risk populations; and e) following current recommendations for
the treatment of TB. TB control program managers should make every effort to
incorporate each of these components into their program activities. TB pro-
grams may perform these activities directly, or programs may coordinate with
other providers to ensure the implementation of these activities. Failure to meet
these core standards can decrease a TB program’s effectiveness in controlling
this reemergent public health risk.
INTRODUCTION
The incidence of tuberculosis (TB) was declining in the United States until recently,
and in 1989, goals were set to eliminate the disease by the year 2010 (1 ). However,
instead of continuing to decline, TB morbidity increased 14% from 1985 through 1993
(2 ). This recent trend has been attributed to several factors, including the human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic, the occurrence of TB in foreign-born persons
from countries that have a high prevalence of TB, and the transmission of Mycobac-
terium tuberculosis in congregate settings (e.g., health-care facilities, correctional
facilities, drug-treatment centers, and homeless shelters). The increase in TB and the
complexity of factors associated with this increase have placed additional demands
on public health TB control programs, yet many of these programs lack adequate sup-
port for services necessary for TB control. In particular, funding for TB control
programs has been reduced markedly because of the increased competition for public
health funds; the decrease in government services at federal, state, and local levels;
and the decline in TB cases reported before 1985 (3 ). The public health-care infra-
structure must be rebuilt to meet the challenge of the recent resurgence of TB cases
(4 ).
In the United States, state and local health departments have legal responsibility
for the prevention and control of TB in communities. Three strategies are fundamen-
tal to the prevention and control of TB. The first priority is identifying and treating
persons who have active TB; this priority entails identifying persons who have TB,
ensuring that they complete appropriate therapy, and, in exceptional circumstances,
using confinement measures. The second priority is finding and screening persons
who have been in contact with TB patients to determine whether they have TB infec-
tion or disease and providing them with appropriate treatment. The third priority is
screening high-risk populations to detect persons who are infected with M. tuberculo-
sis  and who could benefit from therapy to prevent the infection from progressing to
TB disease.
To implement these three strategies, public health TB control programs should co-
ordinate with health-care providers from several community organizations to ensure
the provision of direct services for TB patients. Health departments are responsible for
providing centralized, coordinated systems for many activities extending beyond indi-
vidual patient care (e.g., identifying TB cases; ensuring that patients complete therapy;
performing contact investigations; screening high-risk groups; and collecting, analyz-
ing, and publishing epidemiologic and surveillance data).
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PURPOSE
The Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) has prepared this
report to provide a national standard* for the assessment of individual TB control
programs by TB control program managers, policymakers, and other persons evaluat-
ing TB programs. This report also may be used to assist local programs in obtaining
and maintaining adequate resources for TB control activities. In addition to defining
the essential components of a TB control program, these recommendations empha-
size the importance of prioritizing TB control activities; coordinating care with other
health-care providers, facilities, and community organizations; and using alternative
approaches to TB control (e.g., the expanded use of directly observed therapy, tar-
geted screening and prevention programs to high-risk populations, and adoption of
current recommendations for the treatment of TB) (5–7 ). Although the size and struc-
ture of TB control programs vary according to each community’s specific needs, TB
control program managers should attempt to incorporate each of these core compo-
nents into program activities.
OVERALL PLANNING AND POLICY
To achieve effective TB control and progress toward TB elimination, TB control pro-
grams should develop an overall TB control strategy, including written policies and
procedures, and should be able to provide guidance and oversight to local facilities
and practitioners involved in TB control activities. TB control programs should ensure
that appropriate laws and adequate staff and funding are available to support TB
control activities. These programs also should form networks and coalitions with
community groups to assist with implementing TB control activities.
An Overall TB Control Strategy and Written Policies and Procedures
TB control programs should develop an overall TB control strategy in collaboration
with local health-care providers, professional societies, and voluntary organizations.
To determine specific needs, the program should use local TB morbidity data and
standard indicators of program performance (e.g., the rate of completion of therapy).
The plan should be developed by the state or local ACET in conjunction with commu-
nity TB coalition representatives. The TB control strategy should outline program
priorities and objectives reflecting the specific needs of the community and the roles
of the various agencies, organizations, and providers. TB control programs should
also have written policies and procedures that clearly define the standard of practice
for TB treatment and prevention in the community (1,5–18 ). These priorities, objec-
tives, and plans should be reviewed periodically and revised as needed.
Advising Local Institutions and Practitioners
TB control programs should provide consultation and oversight for the TB control
activities of local facilities and practitioners (and local health departments where ap-
propriate) to ensure that these efforts reflect current standards of care and public
health practice. The consultation may be provided by either health department staff or
local or regional medical experts who have agreed to act as consultants for the health
*The word “standard” is being used to indicate a prototype established by authority, custom,
or general consent.
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department. Consultants should be available to advise local practitioners about
patient management problems (e.g., monitoring treatment adherence); at least
one consultant should be experienced in treating patients having drug-resistant TB.
Information on the latest laboratory techniques and technology, guidance about ap-
propriate laboratory methods for local facilities and laboratories, and assistance in
conducting contact or outbreak investigations should be available from TB control
programs or their consultants. TB programs should seek opportunities to inform per-
sons or facilities about activities and technologies that can improve TB services.
Appropriate Laws and Regulations to Support TB Control Activities
TB control programs periodically should review applicable laws, regulations, and
policies to ensure their consistency with currently recommended medical and public
health practices (8 ). States and municipalities should create laws, regulations, and
policies that provide support and a legal basis for the following TB control activities:
• ensuring the prompt, mandatory reporting of each confirmed and suspected case
of TB;
• observing state and local laws and regulations protecting patient confidentiality;
• examining persons at high risk for TB infection and disease and prescribing and
monitoring appropriate treatment for these persons;
• ensuring that a treatment plan is devised for all hospitalized patients before their
discharge;
• ensuring rapid laboratory examination of specimens and reporting of results (in-
cluding susceptibility-test results) to the appropriate health department and the
requesting clinician;
• ensuring that patients who have TB receive appropriate treatment until they are
cured;
• protecting the health of the public by isolating and treating persons who have infec-
tious TB;
• detaining persons who, though not infectious, are unwilling or unable to com-
plete treatment and who are at risk for becoming infectious again and acquiring
drug-resistant TB; and
• treating patients without consideration of their ability to pay.
States also should require health-care facilities and congregate-living settings (e.g.,
correctional facilities) to apply recommended measures for infection control.
Adequate and Appropriate Staff to Conduct TB Control Activities
TB control programs should have adequate and appropriate staff to ensure the ful-
fillment of TB control activities outlined in this report. The number and type of staff
for these programs may vary, depending on the local TB morbidity and the specific
needs of the community. Staff are necessary for program planning, program funding,
record-keeping, education, and coordination of health department activities with other
TB control activities in the community. All TB control programs should have a desig-
nated program manager. These programs should have access to, or have on staff,
epidemiologists qualified to conduct data-based evaluation and surveillance activities.
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Community outreach workers are needed to deliver directly observed TB therapy,
thereby ensuring continuity and completion of treatment. Outreach workers may also
be involved in other activities (e.g., educating patients, observing preventive therapy,
conducting contact investigations, arranging or providing transportation, assisting pa-
tients with social services, serving as interpreters, and assisting clinicians with clinical
services). These outreach workers may be nurses or lay persons specifically trained
for these activities. The TB program should ensure that outreach workers have ade-
quate clinical and administrative supervision.
Depending on clinic needs, clinic staff may be composed of various combina-
tions of nurses, physicians, physician assistants, and other workers. In many areas,
clinics have nurse managers responsible for providing most of the education, treat-
ment, clinical monitoring, prevention services, and supervisory needs of the clinic. A
physician who is qualified and trained in the diagnosis, management, and clinical
monitoring of TB should be available on staff or employed on a contract basis. Clinic
staff should have characteristics appropriate to the community’s cultural and lan-
guage needs.
Adequate Funding to Conduct TB Control Activities
TB control programs should seek funding for TB control activities from federal,
state, local, and private sources. They should work with local organizations (e.g., state
and local medical societies, lung associations, and TB coalition members) to educate
policymakers about the local TB problem and local program priorities, needs, and ob-
jectives.
Networks with Community Groups
Optimal TB prevention and control activities require a multidisciplinary approach.
Thus, TB control programs in communities having a high prevalence of TB should
form networks and coalitions with local groups (e.g., cultural and ethnic organizations,
community clinics, places of worship, professional societies, lung associations, and
medical and nursing schools). In collaborating with these community groups, the TB
control program should a) ensure that community leaders, health-care providers, and
policymakers are knowledgeable about TB; b) help educate the public about TB; and
c) provide guidance and assistance for local screening and prevention services. Coali-
tions with community groups help TB control programs reach high-risk groups more
effectively and provide culturally appropriate services. TB control programs should
educate and advise community groups to ensure the quality and appropriateness of
TB control activities in accordance with the community’s needs. The National Coali-
tion to Eliminate Tuberculosis exemplifies a national coalition involved in educating
health-care providers and the public about TB.
MANAGING PERSONS WHO HAVE DISEASE OR WHO ARE
SUSPECTED OF HAVING DISEASE
TB control programs should ensure that the services needed to evaluate, treat, and
monitor TB patients are readily available in each community. In many areas, these
services may be provided directly by the state TB control program. In other areas,
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local TB control programs or health-care professionals, with supervision and consul-
tation from the state TB control program, provide treatment services to patients.
Although some patients may undergo most of their evaluation and treatment in set-
tings other than the health department, the major responsibility for monitoring and
ensuring the quality of all TB-related activities in the community should be undertaken
by the health department as part of its duties to protect the public health.
The public health goals of TB patient management are to initiate treatment
promptly and ensure the completion of effective therapy to cure illness, reduce trans-
mission, and prevent the development of drug-resistant TB.
Clinical Services
Developing a Treatment Plan
A specific health department employee (case manager) should be assigned pri-
mary responsibility and held accountable for ensuring that each patient is educated
about TB and its treatment, that therapy is continuous, and that contacts are exam-
ined. Some specific responsibilities also may be assigned to other persons (e.g.,
clinical supervisors [nurses, physicians, or physician assistants], outreach workers,
health educators, and social workers).
As soon as TB is diagnosed or suspected, treatment should be started, and the TB
case should be reported to the health department. Within 3 working days after the
case is reported, a health department worker should visit the patient in the hospital or
home to initiate patient education, identify contacts, make appropriate referrals for
medical evaluation, and detect possible problems related to adherence to therapy. In
cooperation with the other medical, nursing, and outreach staff providing care to the
patient, the case manager should develop an initial treatment and monitoring plan
based on the initial visit, the medical and nursing assessment, and other available
information (Table 1). The initial treatment plan should be developed within 1 week of
diagnosis (i.e., within 1 week of initiation of therapy for a person suspected to have TB
or within 1 week of identification of a person having a positive culture). This treatment
plan should be reviewed regularly and modified as needed when additional relevant
information becomes available (e.g., susceptibility-test results) or when the care of the
patient is transferred from one provider to another.
The treatment plan should include the specifics of the medical regimen, a monitor-
ing plan for toxicity and for clinical and bacteriologic response, and an assessment
of the patient’s social, behavioral, and additional medical needs that may affect conti-
nuity or completion of therapy (19 ). The health department employee responsible
for monitoring treatment adherence should identify and implement methods that
promote adherence and that are appropriate to the patient’s needs and desires. A
treatment plan should be designed for efficiency and economy of services and con-
venience to the patient.
When developing and implementing a treatment plan, TB control programs should
work closely with health-care providers from local hospitals, drug-treatment centers,
HIV clinics, correctional facilities, health maintenance organizations, private physi-
cians’ offices, and other facilities where TB patients receive medical care. TB control
programs should fulfill their mandated responsibilities and also respect the relation-
ship between patient and primary health-care provider.
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I. Assignment of responsibility
A. Case manager (i.e., person assigned primary responsibility)
B. Clinical supervisor (e.g., nurse, physician, physician assistant)
C. Other caregivers (e.g., outreach worker, nurse, physician, physician assis-
tant)
D. Person responsible for completing the contact investigation 
II. Medical evaluation
A. Tests for initial evaluation (e.g., tuberculin skin test, chest radiograph,
smear, culture, susceptibility tests, HIV test), including results of each test
and date completed
B. Important medical history (e.g., previous treatment, other risk factors for
drug resistance, known drug intolerances, and other medical problems)
C. Potential adverse reactions
1. Appropriate baseline laboratory tests to monitor toxicity (e.g., liver en-
zymes, visual acuity, color vision, complete blood count, audiogram,
BUN, and creatinine), including results of each test and date com-
pleted
2. Potential drug interactions
D. Obstacles to adherence
III. TB treatment
A. Medications, including dosage, frequency, route, date started, and date
to be completed for each medication
B. Administration 
1. Method (directly observed or self-administered)
2. Site(s) for directly observed therapy 
IV. Monitoring 
A. Tests for response to therapy (e.g., chest radiograph, smear, and culture),
including planned frequency of tests and results
B. Tests for toxicity, including planned frequency of tests and results
V. Adherence plan
A. Proposed interventions for obstacles to adherence
B. Plan for monitoring adherence 
C. Incentives and enablers
VII. TB education
A. Person assigned for culturally appropriate education
B. Steps of education process and date to be completed
VIII.  Social services
A. Needs identified
B. Referrals, including date initiated and results
IX.  Follow-up plan
A. Parts of treatment plan to be carried out at TB clinic 
B. Parts of treatment plan to be carried out at other sites and person(s) con-
ducting activities
TABLE 1. Elements of a treatment plan for TB patients
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Clinic Services
Clinic services provided by TB control programs should be accessible and accept-
able to the members of the community served by the clinic. Clinic hours should be
convenient and preferably should include some evening hours for persons who work
or attend school during the day. The clinic should be easily accessible by public trans-
portation, or transportation should be provided. Intervals between the time of referral
and the time of appointment and waiting times in the clinic should be kept to a mini-
mum. In busy TB clinics or multipurpose clinics, priority should be given to persons
having TB or suspected of having TB and to persons receiving TB medications. Clinic
services, including diagnostic evaluation, medications, and transportation, should be
provided without consideration of the patient’s ability to pay. The clinic should have
staff members who speak the same language and have similar cultural and socioeco-
nomic backgrounds as the community served by the clinic, or the clinic should employ
persons trained to work in cross-cultural settings.
Promoting Adherence
Methods for promoting adherence to therapy should be tailored to the patient’s
needs, life-style, social support system, and beliefs about health. An assessment of
these factors should be included in the development of a treatment plan (19,20 ). Pa-
tients should be educated about the causes and effects of TB, the dosing and possible
adverse reactions of their medication, and the importance of taking their medication
according to the treatment plan. To facilitate adherence, the plan should use short-
course treatment regimens and, for patients whose therapy is not directly observed,
fixed-dose combination tablets. Providing transportation to the clinic also is important
for promoting adherence. A welcoming and respectful atmosphere within the clinic
setting is fundamental to maintaining adherence.
Consideration should be given to treating all patients with directly observed
therapy (DOT) (6,7 ). With DOT, a health-care provider or other responsible person
observes the patient swallowing each dose of anti-TB medication. DOT may be admin-
istered with daily or intermittent regimens and may be given to patients in an office or
clinic setting or by an outreach worker in the patient’s home, place of employment,
school, or other mutually agreed-upon place. In some instances, DOT may be admin-
istered by the staff of correctional facilities or drug-treatment programs, home
health-care workers, staff of maternal and child health facilities, or a responsible com-
munity or family member.
Incentives and enablers should be available to enhance adherence to therapy.
These incentives range from simple approaches (e.g., offering a cup of coffee or food
discount coupons and talking with a patient while he or she is waiting in the clinic) to
complex approaches (e.g., obtaining food and housing for a homeless patient).
Health-care professionals, including private practitioners, who become aware of
a TB patient who has demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to adhere to a
prescribed treatment regimen should consult the health department. The TB control
program should assist in evaluating the patient for the causes of nonadherence to
therapy and provide assistance (e.g., outreach-worker services) to enable the patient
to complete the recommended therapy. If the patient still fails to adhere to treatment,
the health department should take appropriate action based on local laws and regula-
tions. This action could entail seeking court-ordered DOT or detention for those
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patients who are unwilling or unable to complete their treatment and who are infec-
tious or who are at risk for becoming infectious or developing drug-resistant TB.
Additional services may be necessary to facilitate continuity and completion of
therapy. Social workers, translators, and referral sources for drug-treatment services
should be available in the clinic or easily accessible to the patients.
Referral System for Other Medical Problems
A system should be in place to facilitate referral of TB patients for evaluation
and treatment of other medical problems, including those conditions (e.g., HIV infec-
tion, underlying malignancy, diabetes mellitus, and substance abuse) that may affect
the course or outcome of TB treatment. Consultants should see referred patients in a
timely fashion, and the assessment and recommendations of the consultant should be
made available promptly to the referring health-care provider. If patients receive care
in more than one setting, treatment should be coordinated with the other health-care
providers to ensure continuity and completion of therapy, minimize drug interactions,
and avoid duplication of efforts. The TB program should take primary responsibility
for ensuring TB treatment and monitoring for adherence.
Clinical Consultative Services
Expert medical consultation should be available for management of all TB patients,
including those who have drug-resistant TB. These consultative services should be
available to the TB control program and health-care providers in the community. The
consultation may be provided by a staff member of the TB control program or by a
local or regional consultant collaborating with the health department.
Inpatient Care
Regardless of the patient’s ability to pay, appropriate accommodations should be
available for any TB patient requiring inpatient hospital care for TB or other condi-
tions. The facility should have effective infection control measures in place to prevent
transmission of TB infection in the hospital (12 ). Medical staff knowledgeable about
the management of TB patients should be available to assist in the care of the patient
while hospitalized. In addition, appropriate medications should be available in the fa-
cility so that the patient can continue therapy in the hospital. Appropriate diagnostic
services (e.g., radiology and mycobacteriology) should be available to monitor the
patient for adverse reactions, the progress of treatment, and other medical conditions.
The local TB program and the facility should develop and implement protocols to en-
sure rapid reporting of known or suspected TB cases to the local health department.
Confinement Capability
To ensure that patients receive treatment until they are cured, TB control programs
should have adequate legal authority and appropriate facilities available to isolate and
treat patients who have infectious TB. When all less restrictive measures have failed,
TB control programs also should have the authority to detain patients unwilling or
unable to complete their treatment. This authority also should apply to nonadherent
patients who are no longer infectious, but who are at risk for again becoming infec-
tious or for the development of drug-resistant TB.
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Infection Control
TB control programs should serve the medical community as sources of informa-
tion and consultation regarding appropriate infection control practices (12 ). During
interactions with the medical community, TB control programs should emphasize the
need to maintain a high level of suspicion for TB in evaluating patients who have TB
symptoms and also the importance of early diagnosis and isolation and prompt initia-
tion of therapy. The programs should give expert advice or provide referrals to experts
for information about appropriate infection control measures for different settings
(e.g., hospitals, clinics, nursing homes, correctional facilities, homeless shelters, and
drug-treatment centers).
TB control programs should provide guidance to local facilities and the community
to ensure the availability of an appropriate number of TB isolation rooms to meet
community needs. Because local needs may change, the adequacy of the number of
isolation rooms should be reassessed each year as part of the evaluation of the TB
control program.
TB control programs should educate the staff of facilities providing care for TB pa-
tients about the need for routine periodic evaluation of infection control practices and
may also assist in the evaluation process. Assistance may include providing current
recommendations and regulations to the facility, providing names of experts in infec-
tion control, or providing access to personnel involved in programmatic evaluations.
Coordinating Care with Other Health-Care Providers and Facilities
TB patients often receive care in multiple settings, including HIV clinics, drug-
treatment centers, correctional facilities, hospitals, nursing homes, or primary care
clinics. When patients move among these various settings, continuity and completion
of therapy may be compromised unless a system for the coordination of care exists.
Discharge planning for hospitalized patients should begin as soon as TB is diagnosed
(i.e., at the time of initiation of therapy in a suspected case or identification of a posi-
tive culture in a confirmed case). A representative from the TB control program should
visit the patient in the hospital to identify contacts, collect information for the initial
treatment plan, and ensure that no obstacles to the patient’s follow-up care exist (see
Managing Persons Who Have Disease or Who Are Suspected of Having Disease). To
provide and coordinate continuous TB treatment and to facilitate transfers of care,
TB control programs should communicate regularly with providers and facilities in-
volved in TB patient care, including hospitals, infection-control practitioners, private
practitioners, community clinics, correctional facilities, homeless shelters, and drug-
treatment centers. TB control programs should consider using a computerized system
for coordinating the care of TB patients.
IDENTIFYING PERSONS WHO HAVE CLINICALLY ACTIVE TB
Diagnostic Methods
Clinics providing services for TB patients should have access to the basic methods
necessary for the diagnosis of TB, including tuberculin skin testing, chest radiography,
sputum induction, and mycobacteriology services for smears, cultures, and drug-
susceptibility testing (see Laboratory and Diagnostic Services). TB control programs
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should provide guidance to facilities about appropriate diagnostic methods for differ-
ent circumstances. Sputum smear examinations and cultures for mycobacteria should
be performed on persons suspected of having active pulmonary or laryngeal TB. Tu-
berculin testing is the standard method for screening asymptomatic populations for
infection with M. tuberculosis. However, screening initially for disease rather than in-
fection may be more appropriate in some circumstances (e.g., when tuberculin skin-
test results may be unreliable, when application and reading of the test may be im-
practical, or when the consequences of an undiagnosed case may be severe). For
example, because elderly persons living in long-term care facilities are at high risk for
the development of TB and may be anergic, all patients admitted to these facilities
should have an initial screening chest radiograph. Chest radiography also may be the
preferable screening method for persons incarcerated in jails or residing in other set-
tings where TB is common and where diagnostic delays may result in large numbers
of persons being exposed to TB.
Case Finding
Most persons who have TB are diagnosed when they seek medical care for symp-
toms caused by TB or other medical conditions. Therefore, for early identification of
TB cases, health-care providers in the community must have an awareness of TB.
Conducting contact investigations is another important way to find TB cases and may
yield approximately 700 cases per 100,000 persons evaluated (CDC Program Manage-
ment Reports 1990–1992, unpublished data). Health departments should seek cases of
TB through active surveillance of mycobacteriology laboratories.
Routine screening with chest radiographs to identify persons who have disease is
justifiable in certain situations, particularly when the prevalence of TB is extremely
high (e.g., among homeless populations or certain immigrant or refugee populations
from areas that have a high prevalence of TB) or when the consequences of an undi-
agnosed case of TB are severe (e.g., in residential facilities for HIV-infected persons,
correctional facilities, homeless shelters [21,22 ], or nursing homes). Using local
epidemiologic data, TB programs should identify these high-risk groups and settings
and determine whether screening is indicated.
Contact Investigation
Staff of TB control programs should begin a contact investigation as soon as they
are notified of a suspected or confirmed case of TB. TB control programs should edu-
cate health-care providers in the community about the need for prompt reporting of
suspected cases. Contact investigations are important for identifying persons who
have TB infection and who are at high risk for the development of active disease. Con-
tact investigations are also important for detecting cases of active TB (5 ).
The priority, speed, and extent of a contact investigation should be influenced by
the likelihood of transmission (based on the characteristics of the source patient, en-
vironment, and contacts) and the possible consequences of infection (especially for
HIV-infected contacts or contacts who are young children).
Vol. 44 / No. RR-11 MMWR 11
IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING PERSONS INFECTED
WITH M. TUBERCULOSIS
TB Skin Testing of High-Risk Groups
TB control programs should assess the prevalence and incidence of TB and the
sociodemographic characteristics of TB patients and infected persons in each commu-
nity. On the basis of these data, TB control programs should design tuberculin
screening programs to reach the community’s high-risk groups (13,16 ). Regular
evaluation of the usefulness of these screening programs is extremely important be-
cause, in general, screening should not be given preference over higher priority
activities (e.g., treatment of TB patients and contact investigation). The practice of
screening low-risk groups should be discontinued.
TB control programs should identify and establish working relationships with per-
sons, facilities, and agencies providing health-care services to high-risk populations
and should assist them in developing and implementing screening programs appro-
priate for various situations. Decisions to initiate programs to skin test high-risk
groups should be based on the ability of the TB control program and these community
groups to provide adequate preventive therapy services. For appropriate implementa-
tion of screening programs, the TB control program and local facilities should be able
to perform tuberculin skin tests, read and interpret the tests, evaluate those persons
who have positive results, initiate preventive therapy when appropriate, monitor pa-
tients for adverse reactions, and ensure that patients complete preventive therapy.
The plan for evaluation and treatment of patients should be developed before testing
begins.
Health-care providers serving high-risk groups should receive assistance from TB
control programs in planning and providing these services, including training staff
and evaluating screening programs to determine their effectiveness. Members of
high-risk groups should be educated about the problem of TB in their community and
should be involved in the implementation of screening and prevention programs.
LABORATORY AND DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES
Chest Radiograph and Interpretation
Outpatient and inpatient facilities offering TB treatment should have ready access
to a sufficient quantity of radiology equipment and enough trained radiology techni-
cians so that chest radiographs can be obtained each day during clinic hours for all
patients needing them. Furthermore, the chest radiograph should be interpreted by a
qualified person, and the report of the chest radiograph findings should be available
within 24 hours.
Mycobacteriology Laboratory
To ensure that results of acid-fast examinations of specimens are available
promptly (ideally, within 24 hours of specimen collection), TB control programs
should have access to adequate mycobacteriology laboratory services. Reports of iso-
lation and identification of M. tuberculosis  should be available within 10–14 days, and
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reports of drug-susceptibility tests should be available within 15–30 days of specimen
collection. The TB control program should work closely with the laboratory to ensure
rapid delivery of specimens to the laboratory and prompt laboratory reporting of acid-
fast bacilli smears, culture results, and results of drug-susceptibility tests to the
clinician and health department. The laboratory should use rapid laboratory methods,
including fluorescent acid-fast staining procedures, inoculation of a liquid medium as
primary culture, nucleic acid probes to identify M. tuberculosis, and, using radiometric
(e.g., BACTEC

) or similar systems, testing of M. tuberculosis  isolates for susceptibil-
ity to the first-line drugs (23 ). These mycobacteriology laboratory services also should
be available to TB control programs for monitoring bacteriologic response to therapy.
Diagnostic Services to Assess Drug Toxicity
The outpatient and inpatient facilities where TB treatment is offered should pro-
vide, or have access to, diagnostic services for monitoring patients for potential
adverse reactions to anti-TB medications. At least monthly during therapy, patients
receiving anti-TB medications should be evaluated by a health-care professional (e.g.,
nurse, physician, or physician assistant) and questioned about possible adverse reac-
tions. The facilities offering TB treatment should be able to perform visual acuity
and color vision evaluations on site. Blood tests for liver enzymes, blood urea nitro-
gen, creatinine, uric acid, complete blood count, and platelets may be performed at
an outside laboratory; however, phlebotomy services should be available on site.
Audiometry should be available on site or at another accessible location. In geo-
graphic areas that have a high prevalence of drug-resistant TB, testing of serum levels
for anti-TB medications, especially cycloserine, should be available through a refer-
ence laboratory.
HIV Testing and Counseling
All persons who have confirmed or suspected TB should be offered HIV counsel-
ing and antibody testing. If TB clinics are unable to perform on-site counseling and
testing, they should coordinate with HIV-testing programs to make these services
available. In geographic areas that have a high prevalence of HIV-infected persons, TB
prevention and control staff should be trained and qualified to provide routine HIV
counseling and antibody testing.
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
Case Reporting
TB control programs should ensure and facilitate TB case reporting from various
community sources (e.g., physicians, laboratories, hospitals, and pharmacies) and
routinely monitor the completeness of reporting and the duration of time between
diagnosis and reporting. TB control programs also should communicate regularly
with infection-control practitioners in hospitals and other facilities that frequently di-
agnose TB. Case reporting is essential to the compilation of national, state, and local
morbidity reports and to program planning and evaluation, and prompt reporting is
necessary for effective contact tracing.
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TB Registry
To carry out mandatory community public health responsibilities, health depart-
ment TB control programs should maintain a computerized record system (case
registry) with up-to-date information on all current clinically active and suspected TB
cases in the community. To ensure follow-up of all TB patients and those persons
suspected of having TB, registry information (e.g., smear, culture, and susceptibility
results; clinical status; chest radiograph results; and doses of medications being ad-
ministered) should be obtained and updated on a continuing basis. A specific health
department staff member should review detailed registry information for TB cases at
least monthly to identify patients who have potential problems with adherence or re-
sponse to therapy (e.g., patients who have persistently positive sputum or who are
taking medications to which their TB organisms are resistant) and to ensure follow-up
(e.g., initiating field follow-up visits or arranging medical consultation with providers).
TB control programs also should maintain records on the examination and treatment
status of the contacts of infectious TB patients and other groups of high-risk infected
persons (e.g., persons coinfected with M. tuberculosis  and HIV).
Protection of Confidentiality
TB control programs should devise policies to ensure the data security and confi-
dentiality of TB records. Strategies should be in place to protect all TB reports,
records, and files containing patient names or other identifying information. Local
policies regarding the security and confidentiality of such information, including HIV
test results, must adhere to all laws applicable in state and local jurisdictions (8,24 ).
TB control programs should collaborate with HIV programs to develop and implement
such policies.
Drug Resistance Surveillance
TB control programs should ensure that drug-susceptibility tests are performed on
all initial isolates of M. tuberculosis  and that the results are reported promptly to the
primary care provider and the local health department. TB control programs should
monitor local drug resistance rates to assess the effectiveness of local TB control ef-
forts and to determine the appropriateness of the currently recommended initial TB
treatment regimen for the area.
Data Analysis and Program Evaluation
To determine morbidity rates, trends, and demographic characteristics of the
TB patient population in the area, TB control programs should analyze the data col-
lected each year. Local health departments should rapidly report cases, including the
necessary demographic information, to state health departments, and states should
regularly forward the reports to CDC. Timely and complete reporting is essential for
local, state, and national public health planning and assessment.
TB control programs should assess program performance by determining the rates
for completion of therapy, contact identification, and initiation and completion of pre-
ventive therapy. At least annually, TB control program staff should assess progress
toward achievement of program objectives. To facilitate the monitoring of TB morbid-
ity and program performance, programs should implement computerized systems for
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data collection and analysis. Program evaluation reports should be shared with the
appropriate public, private, and community groups.
TB control programs should periodically review screening activities to assess their
effectiveness in identifying infected persons and in ensuring that these persons are
completing courses of preventive therapy when appropriate. If reviews demonstrate
that few or no new cases are being identified by particular screening activities, these
activities should be discontinued.
Programs also should conduct periodic reviews of selected records systems (e.g.,
laboratory reports, pharmacy reports, AIDS registries, and death certificates) to vali-
date the surveillance system and to detect any failure to report cases.
TB control programs should analyze each new TB case and each death caused by
TB to determine whether the case or death could have been prevented. Based on such
a review, new policies should be developed and implemented to reduce the number
of preventable cases and deaths.
In collaboration with community-based organizations and professional societies,
health departments should prepare annual reports based on these assessments.
These reports should document the extent and nature of the TB problem in the area,
assess the adequacy of prevention and control measures, and provide recommenda-
tions for program improvements. Some TB programs may determine that an outside
review by experts from the state health department, CDC, local lung associations, or
other TB experts may be helpful to determine methods for improving program per-
formance and community TB control and for providing support for major changes
(e.g., significant restructuring or acquisition of new resources).
TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Staff Training
TB control programs should provide appropriate training and evaluation for all pro-
gram staff at time of employment and at regular intervals so that staff can maintain an
accurate, up-to-date level of knowledge about TB, public health practice, management
and evaluation skills, and other related topics.
Education for Health-Care Providers and Members of the Community
TB control programs should provide leadership in TB education in the community.
To determine needs for training and education, TB control programs should monitor
the level of knowledge about TB among health-care providers, policymakers, and
other community members who provide services to TB patients (e.g., the staff of so-
cial services departments, correctional services departments, mental health offices,
and legal service offices). TB control programs should work closely with medical and
nursing schools, schools of public health, community-based organizations, profes-
sional societies, minority advocacy groups, and others to meet the training and
education needs of the community.
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Screening for Tuberculosis and Tuberculosis Infection
in High-Risk Populations
Recommendations of the Advisory Council
for the Elimination of Tuberculosis
Summary
This report from the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis
updates and replaces previous recommendations for screening for tuberculosis
(TB) and TB infection among high-risk populations. [MMWR 1990;39(No. RR-8):
1–7]. In particular, these recommendations a) emphasize that screening for TB
infection should not be given preference over higher priority TB prevention and
control activities, especially identifying and completely treating all persons who
have active TB as well as conducting prompt, effective contact investigation;
b) provide more detailed recommendations for screening specific high-risk
groups; c) provide a detailed description of the tuberculin skin test; and d) revise
CDC’s previous recommendations regarding anergy testing. This report is for
public health policymakers, administrators, program directors and managers as
well as health-care providers and others who provide care or services to persons
at increased risk for TB infection and disease.
INTRODUCTION
Tuberculosis (TB) is caused by bacteria (Mycobacterium tuberculosis  complex,
which includes M. tuberculosis, M. bovis, and M. africanum ) transmitted from an
infectious source to susceptible persons primarily through the air (e.g., through
coughing) (1 ). Most infected persons do not experience clinical illness, but are usually
asymptomatic and noninfectious. The only evidence of infection may be a reaction to
a tuberculin skin test. However, infection can persist for years, and infected persons
can remain at risk for developing clinical TB, especially if the immune system be-
comes impaired. The estimated number of persons having latent TB infection in the
United States ranges from 10 million to 15 million (CDC, unpublished data).
Because of a higher prevalence of infection or a higher risk for disease for any
given prevalence of infection among certain groups, the incidence of TB may be
higher among these groups than among the total population. Screening and preven-
tive therapy programs are important for persons in these high-risk groups.
PRIORITY OF SCREENING AMONG TB PREVENTION
AND CONTROL ACTIVITIES
Three basic strategies are critical to the prevention and control of TB. The first pri-
ority is identifying and completely treating all persons who have active TB (2,3 ). The
second priority is contact investigation (i.e., finding and evaluating persons who have
had contact with TB patients, determining if they have TB infection or disease, and
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treating them appropriately) (4 ). Contact investigations are important for identifying
persons who have active TB and infected persons at high risk for developing TB. The
third priority is screening populations at high risk for TB to locate persons infected
with TB and giving complete therapy to prevent the infection from progressing
to active, contagious disease (3,5 ). This screening also may identify cases of active
disease.
Although screening high-risk populations for TB infection and providing preventive
therapy are crucial to achieving the nation’s goal of eliminating TB (6 ), completion
of TB therapy and contact investigation should have priority over screening. Decisions
to screen particular groups should be based on local epidemiologic data and
made in consultation with local health jurisdictions to ensure appropriate follow-up,
evaluation, and management of persons having TB infection or disease. Health-care
agencies or other facilities should consult with the local health department before
starting a skin-testing program to ensure that adequate provisions are made for the
evaluation and treatment of persons whose tuberculin skin tests are positive. Tubercu-
lin skin-testing programs that identify infected persons without current disease should
be undertaken only if the diagnostic evaluation and a course of prescribed therapy can
be initiated and completed.
Because most state and local TB control programs that report high TB morbidity
have inadequate resources to screen all persons in high-risk groups and treat those
persons who are infected, involvement of other health-care providers in screening
and preventive treatment activities is important. These health-care providers can
augment the limited resources of health departments by conducting appropriate
screening efforts. This collaboration will necessitate additional efforts to train health-
care workers in the administration, reading, and interpretation of the tuberculin skin
test and in the appropriate use of preventive therapy. Priorities for screening activities
should be determined by assessment of available resources and the probability of
infection and disease among groups in the community.
Groups that have the highest priority in all areas of the country include contacts of
persons who have suspected or confirmed TB and patients who have human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) infection or risk for HIV infection. In particular areas of the
country, other groups at high risk may include persons who inject illicit drugs, persons
who have certain medical risk factors, foreign-born persons recently arrived from
countries with a high incidence or prevalence of TB, and residents of congregate set-
tings where risk for transmitting M. tuberculosis is increased (e.g., correctional
facilities, long-term care facilities, and homeless shelters). Screening persons in low-
risk groups is not likely to be cost-effective and should be discontinued.
HIGH-RISK GROUPS
Based on published reports in the medical literature and CDC surveillance data, the
Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis (ACET) recommends that the fol-
lowing groups be screened for TB and TB infection:
• close contacts (i.e., those sharing the same household or other enclosed environ-
ments) of persons known or suspected to have TB;
• persons infected with HIV;
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• persons who inject illicit drugs or other locally identified high-risk substance users
(e.g., crack cocaine users);
• persons who have medical risk factors known to increase the risk for disease if
infection occurs (see Persons Having Other Medical Risk Factors);
• residents and employees of high-risk congregate settings (e.g., correctional institu-
tions, nursing homes, mental institutions, other long-term residential facilities, and
shelters for the homeless);
• health-care workers who serve high-risk clients;
• foreign-born persons, including children, recently arrived (within 5 years) from
countries that have a high TB incidence or prevalence;
• some medically underserved, low-income populations;
• high-risk racial or ethnic minority populations, as defined locally; and
• infants, children, and adolescents exposed to adults in high-risk categories.
Flexibility is needed in defining high-priority groups for screening. The changing
epidemiology of TB indicates that the risk for TB among groups currently considered
high priority may decrease over time, and groups currently not identified as at risk
subsequently may be considered as high priority. Local public health officials should
identify community groups among whom TB and transmission of infection occur.
Identification of these groups requires collecting and analyzing a) data on newly
reported cases available as part of TB surveillance (e.g., residence, occupation,
race/ethnicity, country of origin, and status of HIV infection, injecting drug use, home-
lessness, and congregate settings), b) data not routinely collected and/or analyzed
(e.g., indicators of socioeconomic status), and c) data from tuberculin screening pro-
grams (e.g., at correctional institutions and health-care facilities). These data will
enable health departments and other local facilities to target screening and treatment
programs to locally defined high-risk populations and areas.
Using surveillance information, local or state TB programs should take the lead in
determining groups to be screened. Responsibility for conducting screening will vary,
depending on local circumstances. For some groups, the local health department
should conduct the screening. For others, the health department should discuss the
need for screening with other appropriate persons (e.g., correctional facility staff, hos-
pital infection control officers, and shelter operators) and offer assistance in training,
evaluation, and, if necessary and possible, provision of supplies. In some areas, gain-
ing the commitment of private health-care providers and community health centers to
screen and provide follow-up for the high-risk patients they serve will be vital.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON SCREENING
Screening persons other than members of high-risk groups is not recommended
because screening low-risk persons diverts resources from other priority activities
and because many positive tests in low-risk persons do not represent TB infection.
The goal of screening programs must be clearly defined: screening is usually con-
ducted to identify infected persons who are at high risk for disease and who would
benefit from preventive therapy or to find persons who have clinical disease and need
treatment. Screening programs also can provide a) epidemiologic data for assessing
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TB and its trends in a community, b) data for assessing the value of continued screen-
ing, and c) baseline data to help with assessment if subsequent exposure occurs
(e.g., for nursing home residents and employees in some occupations). Screening
programs should not be undertaken unless necessary facilities for patient evaluation
and treatment are identified and made available and unless patients found to be posi-
tive are likely to complete preventive therapy.
To the extent possible, members of high-risk groups and their health-care providers
should be involved in the design, implementation, and promotion of screening pro-
grams (6–8 ). Implementation may be enhanced by using health department or other
staff (including trained volunteers) who have linguistic and cultural familiarity with the
population at risk.
SCREENING METHODS
Tuberculin skin testing is the standard method for identifying persons infected with
M. tuberculosis  (1 ). The Mantoux test (i.e., the intracutaneous administration of five
units of purified protein derivative [PPD] tuberculin) best detects infection. Because
they are less specific than the Mantoux test, multiple puncture devices should not be
used to screen high-risk populations (9 ).
Screening for disease rather than infection may be more appropriate in some
circumstances (e.g., when the tuberculin skin-test results may be unreliable, when ad-
ministering and reading the test or following up infected persons for preventive
therapy may be impractical, when the risk for disease is high, or when the conse-
quences of an undiagnosed case may be severe). Chest radiography is the preferred
screening method when the objective is to identify persons who have current pulmo-
nary TB and when preventive therapy for infected persons is not the primary goal
(e.g., in high turnover jails or in some homeless shelters). In these screening pro-
grams, patients who have signs and/or symptoms suggesting pulmonary or pleural
TB (e.g., cough of >2 weeks’ duration) should have a standard posterior-anterior chest
radiograph, regardless of the tuberculin skin-test result. Although TB produces certain
radiographic abnormalities more frequently than others, almost any form of pulmo-
nary radiographic abnormality may result from TB, especially in immunosuppressed
persons (1 ).
THE TUBERCULIN SKIN TEST
A detailed review of the tuberculin skin test has been published recently and is
summarized here (10 ). Tuberculin skin-test results should be evaluated within the
context of each patient’s epidemiologic and environmental potential for infection (11 ).
Sensitivity, Specificity, and Positive Predictive Value
of the Tuberculin Skin Test
Although the tuberculin skin test is now the only method for detecting M. tubercu-
losis infection, the test is neither 100% sensitive nor 100% specific. Sensitivity is a
test’s ability to identify correctly those persons who have a condition (e.g., those
infected with M. tuberculosis). Specificity is a test’s ability to identify correctly those
persons who do not have a condition. In populations having a high prevalence of
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infection with nontuberculous mycobacteria or vaccination with Bacille Calmette-
Guérin (BCG), the specificity of the tuberculin test will be low.
The positive predictive value of the tuberculin test is also variable. Positive
predictive value reflects the ability of a positive test to identify those persons who
have a condition (i.e., the probability that a condition is present when the test is posi-
tive). As the prevalence of TB infection in the population decreases, the positive
predictive value of the tuberculin test also decreases. The prevalence of infection
among the total adult population in the United States is an estimated 5%–10% (CDC,
unpublished data). Among populations residing in areas where cross-reactions
caused by nontuberculous mycobacteria are common, the positive predictive value of
the tuberculin test is low if a cutoff of ≥10 mm is used to define a positive test. 
Interpreting Tuberculin Skin-Test Results
The criteria endorsed by the American Thoracic Society and CDC for a positive tu-
berculin skin-test result are intended to increase the likelihood that persons at high
risk for TB will be candidates for preventive therapy and that persons having tubercu-
lin reactions not caused by M. tuberculosis will not receive unnecessary diagnostic
evaluation or treatment (1,3,4 ).
For those persons who have had recent close contact with a person who has active
TB and for those whose chest radiographic findings suggest TB, skin-test reactions are
likely to represent infection with M. tuberculosis. Persons infected with HIV may have
a limited ability to respond to tuberculin, even if they are infected with tubercle bacilli.
These groups are at high risk for TB. Thus, to ensure that persons infected with TB are
evaluated and appropriately treated, the sensitivity provided by a ≥5-mm cutoff for a
positive test is appropriate for these groups (Table 1). Although persons having HIV
infection have a decreased ability to respond to tuberculin, some severely immuno-
suppressed persons infected with tubercle bacilli may still manifest a positive reaction
and benefit from tuberculin skin testing.
Other factors (e.g., certain medical conditions or injecting-drug use without
simultaneous HIV infection) moderately increase the risk for active TB. A reaction of
≥10 mm should be considered positive for these groups (Table 1). This cutoff is also
appropriate for other groups: persons born in countries with a high prevalence or in-
cidence of TB; medically underserved, low-income populations; residents and
employees of most correctional institutions and nursing homes; health-care workers
in high-risk settings (as defined in CDC guidelines); and, because of the increased risk
for severe disease, children <4 years of age.
Routine screening is not recommended for populations at low risk for infection
with M. tuberculosis. However, if these persons are tested, a higher cutoff of ≥15 mm
is recommended (Table 1).
False-Positive Reactions
A small percentage of tuberculin reactions may be caused by errors in administer-
ing the test or in reading results. However, false-positive results are more commonly
attributable to the presence in tuberculin of antigens shared with other mycobacteria.
The potential sources of cross-reactions caused by these antigens are infection with
nontuberculous mycobacteria and vaccination with BCG. Distinguishing clearly be-
tween reactions caused by infection with M. tuberculosis and those caused by other
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1. An induration of ≥5 mm is classified as positive in the following:
• Persons who have had recent close contact with persons who have ac-
tive TB;
• Persons who have human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection or
risk factors for HIV infection but unknown HIV status;
• Persons who have fibrotic chest radiographs consistent with healed TB.
2. An induration of ≥10 mm is classified as positive in all persons who do not
meet any of the above criteria, but who belong to one or more of the fol-
lowing groups having high risk for TB:
• Injecting-drug users known to be HIV seronegative;
• Persons who have other medical conditions that have been reported
to increase the risk for progressing from latent TB infection to active
TB. These medical conditions include diabetes mellitus, conditions
requiring prolonged high-dose corticosteroid therapy and other
immunosuppressive therapy (including bone marrow and organ trans-
plantation), chronic renal failure, some hematologic disorders (e.g.,
leukemias and lymphomas), other specific malignancies (e.g., carci-
noma of the head or neck), weight loss of ≥10% below ideal body
weight, silicosis, gastrectomy, jejunoileal bypass;
• Residents and employees of high-risk congregate settings: prisons and
jails, nursing homes and other long-term facilities for the elderly,
health-care facilities (including some residential mental health facili-
ties), and homeless shelters;
• Foreign-born persons recently arrived (i.e., within the last 5 years) from
countries having a high prevalence or incidence of TB;
• Some medically underserved, low-income populations, including mi-
grant farm workers and homeless persons; 
• High-risk racial or ethnic minority populations, as defined locally;
• Children <4 years of age or infants, children, and adolescents exposed
to adults in high-risk categories.
3. An induration of ≥15 mm is classified as positive in persons who do not
meet any of the above criteria.
TABLE 1. Summary of interpretation of tuberculin skin-test results
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mycobacteria is difficult. However, the larger the induration, the greater is the likeli-
hood that the reaction represents infection with M. tuberculosis. Similarly, clearly
distinguishing between a tuberculin skin-test reaction caused by infection with M. tu-
berculosis  and a reaction caused by BCG vaccination is difficult. The probability that
a skin-test reaction results from infection with M. tuberculosis rather than from BCG
vaccination increases a) as the size of the reaction increases, b) when the patient is a
contact of a person who has TB (especially if that person has infected others), c) when
a family history of TB exists or when the patient’s country of origin has a high inci-
dence or prevalence of TB, and d) as the interval between vaccination and tuberculin
testing increases (because vaccination-induced reactivity wanes over time and is
unlikely to persist for >10 years) (12,13 ). A history of BCG vaccination is not a contra-
indication to skin testing.
False-Negative Reactions
False-negative tuberculin skin-test reactions have many potential causes (1 ). Non-
responsiveness to delayed-type hypersensitivity-inducing antigens like tuberculin
is common among persons having impaired immunity (e.g., HIV-infected persons).
Delayed-type hypersensitivity can be assessed with skin-test antigens such as tetanus
toxoid, mumps, and Candida. Most healthy persons in the population are sensitized to
these antigens. However, the scientific basis for anergy testing is tenuous (14 ). Most
skin-test antigens used for anergy testing have no standardization. Thus, anergy test-
ing is usually not part of screening for TB infection.
All HIV-infected persons should be tuberculin tested (15,16 ). Those who are
tuberculin-positive (≥5 mm) should be evaluated for TB disease and placed on appro-
priate curative or preventive therapy. Preventive therapy should be administered to
tuberculin-positive, HIV-infected persons, regardless of age. If they are at high risk for
TB, persons failing to react to tuberculin may be evaluated for anergy (17 ), although
the lack of standardization of anergy testing practices should be considered.
Booster Phenomenon and Two-Step Tuberculin Skin Testing
Periodic use of the tuberculin skin test is valuable for the surveillance of tuberculin-
negative persons at risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis. Repeated testing of
uninfected persons does not sensitize them to tuberculin. However, delayed-type hy-
persensitivity resulting from mycobacterial infection or BCG vaccination may
gradually wane with years. Although subsequent initial skin testing may be negative,
the stimulus of a first test may boost or increase the size of the reaction to a second
test administered 1 week to 1 year later and thus may suggest an apparent—but
false—tuberculin conversion.
Although the booster phenomenon may occur at any age, its frequency increases
with age and is highest among persons >55 years of age and/or among those persons
who have had prior BCG vaccination (18 ). When tuberculin skin testing of adults is
repeated periodically, as in employee-health or institutional screening programs, an
initial two-step approach can reduce the likelihood that a boosted reaction will be mis-
interpreted as a recent infection. If the first tuberculin test result is negative, a second
5-TU test should be administered 1 week to 3 weeks later. A positive second result
probably indicates boosting from a past infection or prior BCG vaccination. Persons
having a boosted reaction should be classified as reactors, not converters. If the
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second result is negative, the person is probably uninfected, and a positive reaction to
subsequent tests indicates a true tuberculin skin-test conversion (see Definition of a
Tuberculin Skin-Test Conversion).
Because of problems with continued cross-reactions with other mycobacteria, the
specificity of the tuberculin test is less when serial skin testing is performed than when
a single test is administered. Thus, serial skin-testing programs tend to overestimate
the incidence of new TB infection in the tested population. Because of this potential for
overestimation of incidence, serial skin-testing programs should be targeted to popu-
lations at high risk for continued exposure to infectious TB.
Definition of a Tuberculin Skin-Test Conversion
Recent tuberculin skin-test converters are considered at high risk. An increase in
induration of ≥10 mm within a 2-year period is classified as a conversion to a positive
test among persons <35 years of age. An increase in induration of ≥15 mm within a
2-year period is classified as a conversion for persons ≥35 years of age. Regardless of
age, for employees in facilities where a person who has TB poses a hazard to many
susceptible persons (e.g., health-care facilities, schools, and child-care facilities), an
increase of ≥10 mm induration should be considered positive.
Tuberculin Testing During Pregnancy
Studies in which the same patients were tested during and after pregnancy have
demonstrated that pregnancy has no effect on cutaneous tuberculin hypersensitivity.
Tuberculin skin testing is considered valid and safe throughout pregnancy. No terato-
genic effects of testing during pregnancy have been documented (19 ).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SPECIFIC HIGH-RISK GROUPS
Contacts of Persons Who Have Infectious TB
Because the risk for infection and disease is particularly high among close contacts
of persons having TB, these persons should be identified promptly (usually within
3 days) and examined soon (usually within 7 days) after identification of the poten-
tially infectious patient (4,6 ). State and local health departments should work with
local health-care providers to ensure completion of these monitoring activities.
Prompt notification of state and local agencies about suspected or newly diagnosed
and potentially infectious cases is critical for contact investigation.
Persons Who Have HIV Infection
HIV infection is the strongest risk factor yet identified for the development of TB
disease in persons having TB infection (20–23 ). All HIV-infected persons should re-
ceive a PPD-tuberculin skin test (5-TU, PPD by the Mantoux method) (15,16 ).
Tuberculin testing for persons infected with HIV should be conducted in settings
where HIV-infected persons or those at risk for HIV infection receive care. Administra-
tors should ensure that the recommended screening is implemented and that prompt
follow-up, evaluation, and treatment occurs. Because tuberculin skin-test results are
less reliable as CD4 counts decline, screening should be completed as early as possi-
ble after HIV infection occurs. Those HIV-infected patients at high risk for continuing
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exposure to patients who have TB should be screened periodically for TB infection. If
they have TB symptoms or if they are exposed to a patient who has pulmonary TB,
HIV-infected persons should be evaluated promptly for TB. Because active disease can
develop rapidly in HIV-infected persons, the highest priority for contact investigation
should be given to persons potentially coinfected with HIV and TB.
Persons Who Inject Drugs
Because they are at high risk for TB and HIV infection, the priority for screening is
high for persons who inject illicit drugs (16,20–22,24,25 ). Drug treatment programs
and other settings that provide care for persons who inject drugs should skin test
injecting-drug users. If further evaluation and case management is necessary, ade-
quate referral mechanisms should be in place. Coordination of these activities
with local alcohol and other drug abuse treatment programs should be encouraged.
Priority should be given to screening in facilities that are able to provide on-site,
directly observed preventive therapy for 6–12 months to persons who have TB infec-
tion (e.g., clients of methadone maintenance treatment programs or residential
treatment programs).
Persons Who Have Other Medical Risk Factors
Health-care providers should administer tuberculin tests to all patients who
have medical risk factors that substantially increase the risk for TB (3,22 ). These
patients should be screened in settings where they receive primary or subspecialty
care (e.g., infectious disease, immunology, endocrinology, hematology/oncology,
nephrology, rheumatology, pulmonology, and gastroenterology) or on admission to a
hospital. These medical risk factors include the following:
• HIV infection,
• diabetes mellitus,
• conditions requiring prolonged high-dose corticosteroid therapy and other immu-
nosuppressive therapy (including bone marrow and organ transplantation),
• chronic renal failure,
• some hematologic disorders (e.g., leukemias and lymphomas),
• other specific malignancies (e.g., carcinoma of the head or neck),




In addition, persons who have an abnormal chest radiograph showing fibrotic le-
sions consistent with old, healed TB should be skin tested. Regardless of age, persons
who have a positive skin test and parenchymal lung scarring are at high risk for TB if
they have not previously received TB treatment or preventive therapy.
Residents and Employees of High-Risk Congregate Settings
High-risk environments are settings where a) persons who have infectious TB are
more likely to live, b) environmental characteristics (e.g., type of ventilation and size)
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are conducive to transmission, and c) many susceptible persons at risk for prolonged
exposure to potentially infectious patients may be located. These environments in-
clude prisons and jails (26,27 ), nursing homes and other long-term facilities for the
elderly (28 ), health-care facilities (29 ), homeless shelters (30 ), and residential set-
tings for HIV-infected persons (31 ). Persons working in these settings should be
educated about the risk for transmission, the signs and symptoms of TB, and proper
procedures for minimizing the risk for transmitting TB infection. Clients and employ-
ees should be tuberculin tested on admission or initial employment.
Residents and Employees of Prisons and Jails
Recommendations for screening, treatment, and prevention in correctional facili-
ties advise that on entry, all inmates should be screened for TB symptoms by a
standardized interview process (26,27 ). Persons who have symptoms suggesting pul-
monary TB should be immediately isolated and evaluated for active TB. Initial
screening of inmates may vary, depending on each inmate’s length of stay and on an
assessment of the risk for transmission of TB infection in the facility.
In long-term facilities, tuberculin skin-test screening of all inmates without a docu-
mented positive skin-test result should be mandatory. If boosting is common among
the population served by the facility, two-step skin testing should be considered. In-
mates who have HIV infection and those at risk for HIV infection but whose HIV status
is unknown should have a chest radiograph as part of the initial screening, regardless
of skin-test results.
In short-term facilities serving high-risk populations, tuberculin skin-test screening
is generally not feasible, but is recommended for inmates who will remain in custody
for ≥14 days. Inmates who have HIV infection and those at risk for HIV infection but
whose HIV status is unknown should have a chest radiograph as part of initial screen-
ing, regardless of skin-test status. In some large jails, officials should consider using
on-site chest radiography to screen all inmates (short-term and long-term) for TB. In
short-term facilities serving low-risk populations, screening inmates may be limited to
screening for symptoms, provided that arrangements are made with a collaborating
facility to receive inmates exhibiting symptoms.
Tuberculin skin-test screening also should be mandatory for all correctional staff in
short-term or long-term facilities. Staff should be informed that if they are immuno-
suppressed, they should consult a health-care provider for appropriate follow-up and
screening for TB.
Medical units within correctional facilities should conduct a thorough risk assess-
ment and follow recommendations for prevention of transmission of TB infection
in health-care facilities (29 ). Correctional authorities have primary responsibility
for implementing these programs, but health departments should assist in program
planning and training as well as regulating, advising, monitoring, and evaluating TB-
control activities in correctional facilities. 
Residents and Employees of Nursing Homes/Facilities for the Elderly
Because TB case rates increase with age among all racial and ethnic groups and
both sexes, screening for TB in facilities providing long-term care to the elderly is
recommended (28 ). The incidence of disease is two to seven times higher among
nursing home residents in some areas than among demographically similar persons
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in other settings. Studies indicate that unsuspected transmission of M. tuberculosis in
nursing homes/facilities presents a risk to residents and workers (32,33 ). Residents
should be screened for TB infection on admission by use of the two-step skin-testing
method. Screening with chest radiographs alone is insufficient. Although few resi-
dents will be candidates for preventive therapy, baseline test results are essential to
interpretation of subsequent tests if an acute exposure occurs. The two-step method
also should be used for baseline screening of employees. Testing should be repeated
in the event of exposure.
Residents and Workers at Homeless Shelters
Screening to find cases of active TB among the homeless consists of a chest radio-
graph (and possibly a sputum smear and culture) to determine current disease (30 ).
Tuberculin skin-testing programs identifying infected persons who do not have cur-
rent disease should be undertaken only if the diagnostic evaluation and course of
preventive therapy can be initiated and completed. A special effort should be made to
identify homeless persons coinfected with TB and HIV infection and to provide directly
observed preventive therapy. Unless a shelter has its own health-care staff, the local
government or a government-funded agency should assume responsibility for con-
ducting screening programs for the homeless.
Health-Care Workers 
Transmission of M. tuberculosis is a recognized risk in health-care facilities (29 ).
Transmission is most likely to occur from patients who have unrecognized pulmonary
or laryngeal TB, who are not on effective anti-TB therapy, and who have not been
placed in TB isolation. Recent TB outbreaks in health-care facilities, including out-
breaks of multidrug-resistant TB, have created heightened concern about nosocomial
transmission. Increases of TB in some geographic areas are related to the high risk for
TB among immunosuppressed persons infected with HIV. Transmission of M. tubercu-
losis to HIV-infected persons is of particular concern because, if infected with TB,
these persons are at high risk for the rapid development of active TB. Thus, health-
care facilities should be particularly alert to the need for preventing transmission of
M. tuberculosis in settings where persons who have HIV infection receive care or
work.
Health administrators and infection control departments in hospitals are responsi-
ble for ensuring the implementation of these recommendations. Implementing an
effective TB control program requires risk assessment; early identification, isolation,
and complete treatment of infectious TB patients; effective engineering controls; an
appropriate respiratory protection program; and education, counseling, screening,
and evaluation for health-care workers.
The Foreign-Born
TB is a problem among persons who arrive in the United States from coun-
tries having a high prevalence or incidence of TB (e.g., most countries in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America) (34–37 ). Foreign-born persons at risk include immigrants
(documented and undocumented), refugees, and some migrant workers and stu-
dents. Because disease rates among the foreign-born are highest in the first few years
after arrival in the United States, efforts should be made to screen new immigrants.
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Culturally and linguistically sensitive evaluation and treatment programs should be
provided to help ensure a successful treatment outcome. Services should not be de-
nied because of a real or perceived undocumented immigration status.
Other High-Incidence Population Groups
The incidence of TB is closely related to socioeconomic status; higher rates occur
among persons in low-income groups (38 ). Special control strategies targeted toward
these low-income groups are needed. In addition, community leaders from high-risk
populations and service providers (e.g., health, welfare, and housing) for these groups
should be involved in planning and implementing programs (8 ).
Implementation of TB prevention and control efforts among lower socioeconomic
groups presents special problems because these groups usually have less access to
care, are more likely to have coexisting diseases, lack adequate shelter and transpor-
tation, and encounter more obstacles to treatment and health-care delivery. However,
screening programs have demonstrated success in reaching these groups (39,40 ).
Screening for TB infection among certain occupational groups may occur at the
worksite or other community sites. Screening migrant farm workers for TB infection is
best conducted near home sites rather than at temporary work locations so that
preventive therapy can be completed more easily for those who are infected (41 ).
High-risk groups also may be screened whenever they have access to health care.
Persons Who Use Alcohol and Other Noninjecting Drugs
Because many persons who use alcohol and other noninjecting drugs are
members of high-risk groups (e.g., HIV-infected persons, the homeless, residents of
correctional facilities, and medically underserved, low-income persons), they should
be included in screening activities if they also belong to a high-risk group. Because
persons who use alcohol and other noninjecting drugs may be at risk for repeated
exposure to others who have TB, a risk assessment and, if necessary, screening for TB
infection should be administered on admission to a treatment program and on an
annual basis, unless these persons are known to be tuberculin positive. Screening is
not recommended for those persons who use alcohol and other noninjecting drugs
but who are not members of high-risk groups because this screening diverts re-
sources from higher priority activities.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SCREENING CHILDREN
AND ADOLESCENTS
Although children in high-risk groups or those exposed to adults in high-risk
groups may benefit from screening, most children are not members of high-risk
groups. Mass or individual screening of children at low risk is not recommended be-
cause screening persons at low risk for TB infection diverts resources from higher
priority activities and identifies few infected children (42,43 ). In addition, the reactions
in low-risk children are often false-positive. 
School-based screening for TB infection among children was started in the 1950s
when infection and disease rates were higher than at present. The major purpose of
school testing is to identify infected children who can be treated before the infection
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progresses to infectious TB during adolescence or adulthood. Because broad-based
school testing involves screening large numbers of low-risk children and because the
majority of children who have pediatric TB are preschool age, generalized school
screening as a public health measure is an ineffective method of detecting or prevent-
ing cases of childhood TB and should be discontinued (43 ). 
Well-conducted contact tracing of infectious cases and refugee or immigration test-
ing are more efficient methods than nonselective school-based testing for detecting
children who have TB infection. However, targeted testing of high-risk children should
be encouraged and may be conducted in the school setting (44 ). Before any testing
program for children is implemented, arrangements for evaluation and treatment of
children who test positive should be in place.
REPEAT SCREENING OF PERSONS AT CONTINUING RISK
FOR EXPOSURE 
The need for repeat skin testing should be determined by the likelihood of contin-
ued exposure to infectious TB. All tuberculin-negative persons should be retested if
they are exposed to an infectious person. In some institutional and group-living envi-
ronments (e.g., hospitals, prisons, nursing homes, and shelters for the homeless), the
risk for exposure is enough to justify repeat testing at regular intervals. The frequency
of repeat testing depends on the degree of risk for exposure, as determined by locally
generated data. To assist in making these decisions, local facilities should compile and
analyze their epidemiologic and programmatic data.
ROLE OF HEALTH DEPARTMENTS
In conjunction with local providers serving high-risk populations, health depart-
ments should assist in the development, implementation, and evaluation of TB
screening programs appropriate for their communities by participating in specific ac-
tivities:
• Establishing priorities for prevention and control activities—Screening for TB in-
fection should not be given preference over higher priority activities, especially
complete treatment of patients having TB or TB/HIV infection as well as prompt,
effective contact investigation.
• Determining priorities for screening activities—This determination should be
made by evaluating available resources, the probability of infection and disease
among groups in the community, and the ability to ensure that those persons in-
fected with TB will complete preventive therapy. Groups with the highest screening
priorities include contacts of persons suspected or confirmed to have TB and pa-
tients having HIV infection.
• Reviewing epidemiologic and programmatic data to identify additional groups for
whom screening programs should be developed—This review includes a) assess-
ing the incidence, prevalence, and sociodemographic characteristics of persons
having TB or TB infection; b) identifying high-risk groups and settings to deter-
mine whether a need for screening is indicated; c) designing tuberculin screening
Vol. 44 / No. RR-11 MMWR 31
programs to reach the high-risk groups in communities; and d) ensuring comple-
tion of preventive therapy.
• Identifying and establishing working relationships with persons, facilities, and
agencies providing health-care services to high-risk populations—These service
providers should be assisted in the development, implementation, and evaluation
of screening programs appropriate to the needs of the community. The decision to
initiate a skin testing program for a high-risk group should be based primarily on
the ability of the TB control program and health-care providers to provide adequate
preventive therapy services (i.e., tuberculin skin testing, reading and interpreting
the tests, evaluating persons who have positive results, initiating preventive ther-
apy when appropriate, monitoring patients for adverse reactions, and ensuring that
patients complete preventive therapy). To be effective, the plan for evaluation and
treatment should be developed before testing begins.
• Assisting health-care providers who serve high-risk groups—These providers
should be assisted in providing screening services, evaluating data from screening
programs to determine program effectiveness, and recommending appropriate fu-
ture screening activities.
• Providing support for staff training—Staff should be trained to perform, read,
and record results of tuberculin skin tests; evaluate positive-tuberculin reactors for
clinical TB and preventive therapy; provide preventive therapy and monitor for ad-
herence and adverse drug reactions; and educate clients regarding the need for
preventive therapy. The health department or facility may certify staff completing
this training.
• Identifying medical consultants having expertise in TB patient management—
These consultants should be able to assist with managing persons who have TB or
are suspected to have TB, their contacts, and persons receiving preventive therapy.
• Arranging referrals and monitoring—Upon request, assistance should be provided
in making arrangements for referring and monitoring persons who have clinical TB
or adverse drug reactions while on preventive therapy.
• Reviewing screening activities—Periodic assessments of screening activities are
needed to examine the effectiveness of identifying infected persons and of ensur-
ing that these persons complete preventive therapy.
• Evaluating screening programs—Regular assessments of screening programs are
needed to determine their effectiveness. Recommendations for continuing or dis-
continuing screening programs should be made on the basis of their effectiveness.
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